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Brentano, F.

The Psychology of Sub-Personalities - A Self Soul Spirit Approach

Philosophical investigations on space time and the continuum. Barry Smith, Trans. New York: Routledge. Cassirer, E. Newton and Leibniz. The Philosophical Review, 52 4 , Revealing the fact: the inseparable relation between the self and time PhD thesis. Cummins, P. Kant on outer and inner intuition. Descartes, R.

Meditations on first philosophy. A discourse on the method Ian Mclean, Trans. Heidegger, M. Kant and the problem of metaphysics Richard Taft Trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hume, D. A treatise of human nature. Kant, I. Kants gesammelte schriften, AkademieAusgabe. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Critique of pure reason Norman Kemp Smith, Trans. New York: St.

Lectures | Between Medieval and Modern: Philosophy from | University of Colorado Boulder

Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view M. Jane Gregor, Trans. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Keller, P. Kant and the demand of self-consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kitcher, P. Kant on self-consciousness. The Philosophical Review, 3 , Longuenesse, B. Kant and the capacity to judge: sensibility and discursivity in the transcendental analytic of the critique of pure reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press.


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Melnick, A. Newton, S. Mathematical principles of natural philosophy and his system of the world Andrew Motte Trans. New York: Daniel Adee. Paton, H. London: Routledge. Pereboom, D. Its relinquishment would entail a revision of the theory of intentionality. Intentionality can no longer be generally defined as bestowal of sense, for, in the last analysis, such a definition implies that, at the basis of the structural hierarchy of intentional functions and accomplishments, there is a bestowal of sense on hyletic data which in themselves are devoid of it [sense].

Behnke, David Carr et al. I will come back to this divergence later, when I discuss the philosophical treatment that Maurice Merleau-Ponty gave to the Gestalt-psychological discourse and its results, most importantly the idea of the body schema. Before entering more deeply into the phenomenological and Gestalt-psychological sources, I will shortly discuss the historical relations between the two modes of inquiry.

This work has been commented on by most later Gestaltists, and it provides the common reference point for the different Gestalt-theoretical schools, such as the Berlin School of Max Wertheimer, and the Graz School founded by Alexius Meinong. What we find in his lectures and other writings is not a fully developed systematic mereology, but methodological reflections which provide a series of important distinctions. These distinctions were groundbreaking, and were reinterpreted and developed by Husserl in his third Logical Investigation. Brentano developed his concepts of parts and wholes in order to make sense of his distinction between pure descriptive psychology or psychognosy and genetic psychology.

The 18 The tradition of Gestalt theory was also influenced by developments in physics, most importantly by the concepts of field theory. See e. The latter provides causal explanations of the physiological and physical conditions under which particular or specific psychic phenomena occur in human minds. The explanations of genetic psychology are methodologically secondary and dependent on the descriptive results in the sense that they presuppose the units and structures which only pure psychology is able to disclose and explicate.

Most modern theorists operated on the assumption that the parts of consciousness are spatial or quasi-spatial parts partes extra partes , succeeding one another or lingering side-by-side in the internal realm. Accordingly, the ultimate constituents of consciousness were conceived of as spiritual atoms. Brentano rejected the idea of spatial or the same School, was a disciple of Husserl. Thus, we can say that seeing and hearing the orchestra are two mutually separable parts of one and the same complex conscious state. Hearing and seeing exemplify mutually separable parts, but Brentano points out that consciousness also includes one-sidedly separable parts.

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Such a part-part relationship holds, for example, between the activities of seeing and attending: I cannot attend to the sound of the violin without hearing it, but I can hear the sound, Brentano argues, without attending to it. On the contrary, most psychic parts are interdependent and belong to consciousness only as bound together. An example of such a bondage is the connection between sensed qualities, such as color and spatial determination. Neither the color nor the spatial determinants of a spot can be changed, Brentano argues, without removing the spot and replacing it by another spot.

Most importantly, he argues that the intentional structure which characterizes all conscious states includes two principal parts which are mutually 23 Brentano, ibid. These cannot exist independently of one another, but can only be differentiated by concepts. He attacked the modern notion according to which the self is a non-material entity which supports its mental states in the same way as a bridge supports the various vehicles that pass over it. Brentano revised the Aristotelian idea of inclusion with his concepts of parts and wholes.

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He argued that the perceiving mind should not be conceived as a whole with two separable parts — the thing which is able to perceive and the perception that it occasionally entertains. Rather, the whole in question — the perceiving mind — is a result of an enrichment or augmentation of the mind as its proper non-identical part.


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In The Theory of Categories, Brentano explains: Among the entities that have parts, there are some whose whole is not composed of a multiplicity of parts; it appears much rather as an enrichment of a part, though not as a result of the addition of a second part. Antos C. Rancurello, P.

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Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister London: Routledge, [] , 88— So the parts of the intentional relation — the intentional pair — are one type of distinctional parts. Moreover, some parts are properly distinctional and others distinctional merely through modification. For these distinctions, see, Brentano, ibid.